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PERFORMANCE AS IDEOLOGY 
Ian Pace 
 
Lecture, Radical Philosophy Conference, Birkbeck College, London, 19th March 2005 
 
 
Schools of thought which link of issues of musical composition with wider social and 
political concerns have been extensively developed in many parts of the world, and 
especially in Germany, though the very fact of making such links still remains a 
highly contentious issue. To a great many people in the classical music world in 
particular, it can be almost sacreligious to suggest their implied pure aestheticism is in 
actuality by no means independent of the social world within which they exist. 
Certainly in Britain and America, discourse about music-making that seeks to relate 
abstract musical concerns to social processes tends to be met with a large degree of 
hostility, which to me speaks volumes about the dominant class composition of those 
able to participate in that musical scene. 
 
Under the influence of the writings of Theodor Adorno writings in particular, 
however, a discourse in this fashion exists with respect to contemporary composition. 
Whether or not one accepts some of his paradigms or the particular musicological 
methodologies that he inherited from German high bourgeois culture is of course a 
separate issue. For those engaging with folk musics, jazz and other popular music, it 
is hardly so controversial to examine the nature of the commercial infrastructure 
which enables musical production and consider how this might affect the actual 
musical results. In jazz in particular, the demarcation between ‘composer’ and 
‘performer’ is nothing like as clear cut as it is the ‘classical’ field, and this sort of 
discourse might equally well be applied to either type of musical worker.  
 
I wish to take this sort of debate further, with a particular focus on classical music 
which is my own primary field. I want to suggest ways in which we might find more 
viable ways of engaging with performance as a specifically ideological field of 
aesthetic activity. In the relatively short space of time I have today, I can’t possibly 
offer a comprehensive model for such study. What instead I wish to do is simply to 
suggest some ways in which common aesthetic concerns mask deeper ideological 
assumptions, so as to imply how this attitude might fruitfully be applied. Above all, I 
want to suggest the role performance might have as part of the process of musical 
appropriation, to my mind a much more fundamental role than has hitherto been 
assumed. 
 
This has become a concern to me in particular from observing certain aesthetic 
tendencies within the field of contemporary classical music, my own specialist field. I 
have observed progressively how the performance aesthetics surrounding radical 
modernist work, as expressed in critical discourse and other more informal arenas, has 
come to privilege those styles and attitudes that blunt and distill this radicalism by 
various means. To me, this is part of (perhaps unconscious) strategy to render the very 
immediacy and potency of modernist concerns as little more than some commodified 
‘style’, no different to any other supermarket product, as befits post-modern 
consumerist ideologies. To explain how this occurs would require more time than I 
have today, and a detailed examination of comparative performances of some 
modernist works. I want instead to outline some developments in performing 
aesthetics in the latter half of the 20th century, so as to suggest ways of perceiving 
their ideological determinants. The implications for music of all eras should hopefully 
become apparent. 
 
As a practising performer myself, an impetus to engage with these issues stemmed 
from a gradual realisation of the situation that Sartre described with respect to the 19th 
century French novelists – writing for a bourgeoisie who in reality they detested. I 
wouldn’t by any means wish to make ridiculous claims for some revolutionary 
potential in musical performance. Nonetheless, one’s audience is frequently 
constituted from the reactionary bourgeoisie – for a socialist musician, surely to 
deliver the type of performance that causes no disturbance within this class’s 
complacent and self-serving view of culture would be a form of complicity and 
possible hypocrisy? 
 
An aesthetic debate around performance and its objectives has become relatively 
sophisticated in the classical field in the last few decades, as a result of the thrashing 
out of charged positions relating to the phenomenon of ‘historically-informed 
performance’. This movement, which has come to prominence in the post-war era, 
constituted a break with the notion that one essentially interprets a musical text in the 
light of whatever the performance aesthetics of one’s time happen to me. This 
previous conviction relied upon an idea of continual progress which for obvious 
reasons had lost some currency in all cultural fields in the aftermath of the second 
world war. At the same time performers were rediscovering a wide range of early 
music, for which some study of performance practice was necessary in order to make 
any sense of the texts that were bequeathed. So extensive study was embarked upon 
into conventions of interpretation, instruments used, all sorts of stylistic factors, which 
naturally led to a greater study of the social and cultural context within which the 
music was performed. This process gradually extended through the classical 
repertoire until such metholodogies were applied to the more standard repertoire, 
including the music of Bach, Handel, Haydn, Mozart, Beethoven, Schubert and 
beyond. When radically different approaches were then being offered in the context of 
the repertoire which was the mainstay of most other performers, it was inevitable that 
battle-lines would be drawn, especially as the new performers could claim some ideal 
of ‘historical authenticity’ to validate their approaches. 
 
As a result, deep questions were raised about both the possibility and the value of 
attaining some sort of historical ‘authenticity’, for reasons that relatively clear to 
understand. It was asked whether we can possibly imagine how music sounded in its 
own time, conditioned as we are to hear everything that has occurred in the interim 
period (including in non-classical music). The generally empirical methodology 
(involving extensive study of primary source documents, including treatises, 
composers’ letters, first-hand accounts, study of historical instrument manufacture, 
etc.) that was generally applied also came under rigorous scrutiny, raising deeper 
questions of historiography. Some critics would challenge the alleged claims of 
historical verisimilitude claimed by the early historically-aware performers, pointing 
out that their methods could only reveal a very fragmentary picture, and was 
excessively biased in favour of that performance information that happened to be 
written down. A great deal of information conveyed merely through oral tradition, not 
to mention unconscious conventions rarely questioned by performers of the previous 
historical times, could never really be ascertained using these methods. One might see 
a parallel with attempts to re-enact historical modes of pronunciation and diction, with 
similar difficulties. Over and above this, as anyone learning a foreign language 
knows, the personalised deviations that a native speaker makes use of can be as 
defining an attribute of the language as that which can be summarised in terms of 
‘rules’. As a consequence, it has been suggested that historically-aware performers, by 
the very nature of their endeavour, tend to situate a work of music primarily within a 
field of generalised historical conventions in a manner that overshadows the 
individuality of a particular composer and work. 
 
Another important question that has been raised concerns the value of locating a 
musical work in the past rather than the present. Would such works not be rendered 
more amenable to a musical museum culture (which bourgeois listeners might value 
all the more) as a result of such processes? Should we not be instead concentrating on 
what these works mean ‘now’ rather than ‘then’? This question is somewhat more 
multifaceted than it appears in the arguments of the protagonists, I believe. Since 
relatively early in the 20th century, there has been an unprecendented move on the part 
of performers away from a primary engagement with music of their own time, as had 
existed in previous eras. The vast majority of classical performers and students 
nowadays will perform a repertoire vastly dominated by music written from a period 
approximately from the mid 17th-century until the mid-20th at best, with the 
occasional foray into earlier or later repertoire. As such, the idioms they develop are 
predicated upon this work, and contemporary perceptions of it, rather than deriving 
from the music composed in their own time. Some would say that a certain late-
romantic style of performance, albeit with various modifications, became ‘frozen in 
time’ at a certain point towards mid-century, divorced from the new idioms required 
by modernist developments in composition. This style perhaps had a potency and a 
contemporaneity in the earlier 20th century from which it originated, but subsequently 
descended into the level of reified mannerism. Those who choose to passively inhabit 
this style of course have little interest in the inner dialectics that existed when it was 
itself a vibrant and living concern, connected to contemporary reality, rather than the 
empty nostalgia for idealised past times that has come to represent since then. 
 
The point I am trying to make here is that the question of relating past music to ‘now’ 
would be more viable if we could speak of an active tradition of contemporary music 
making, concentrating on the works of our own time. Of course there is such a field, 
of which I count myself part, but it continues to exist on the margins of classical 
music-making. Some of the protagonists in the historically aware field, most notably 
the conductor Nicolaus Harnoncourt, have argued this point most cogently, 
maintaining the need for critical engagement and study of past idioms when living 
musical traditions no longer exist in the manner they did in the past. Critics of this 
movement, most notably the American writer Richard Taruskin, claim that most 
supposedly historically-aware performances are highly selective in their use of 
historical data, looking primarily for that which they can find which corresponds to a 
modernistic aesthetic. Thus modernity is presented under the auspices of antiquity. 
Now Taruskin is in many senses an anti-modernist ideologue, and his arguments need 
to be viewed in light of this fact. Whilst recognising that some of his specific 
examples certainly warrant attention, I would suggest that one can turn his 
convictions on their head. If one views musical modernism not as an isolated stylistic 
moment, as Taruskin might like to, but rather as an extension of various musical 
aspects that reach back far in history, then there is no reason to suppose that 
Harnoncourt et al are doing other than illuminating this deeper modernist history. This 
is of course not what a reactionary ideologue like Taruskin would like to believe, 
conflicting as it does with his implied view of musical history in terms of isolated 
individualistic romantic expression transcending its time and place, against which the 
dialectical interactions that modernism forced onto the aesthetic agenda appear as a 
temporary aberration.  
 
Taruskin associates both historically-informed and modernistic performance (for him 
the two are relatively synonymous) with qualities of objectivity and geometry. One 
can often find in historically-aware performance such qualities as regularity of rhythm 
and pulse, acuity of accentuation , and an emphasis upon clarity of line and individual 
parts even within orchestral performance, certainly in comparison to late romantic 
styles. Harnoncourt has written of the clear sense of hierarchies, of line, part-writing, 
harmonic and rhythmic relationships, etc. that were implicit and understood within 
music of the baroque and classical eras in particular. Again I wish to look at the 
possible ideological connotations of these things. It could be claimed that an 
elucidation of the clear hierarchical structures in this music represents some nostalgia 
for a world where classes, genders, races were clearly stratified (ethnicity can have a 
direct musical representation as for example in the use of Turkish music in the work 
of Mozart and Beethoven). So a performance that brings these things out might return 
us to such a world where ‘everyone knew their place’, as opposed to the more 
complex reality of today, represented in music by more fluid and problematic inner 
interactions. But I think this is untrue. On one hand, I believe the inner hierarchies 
implicit in late romantic performance idioms to be every bit as fixed and immutable, 
for reasons I don’t have time to elaborate here. But the earlier music that Harnoncourt 
is referring to is by no means ‘passive’ in the sense that Adorno suggests. On the 
contrary, it inhabits a hierarchical idiom and problematises it. Beethoven’s music, to 
my mind, does not represent an organic closed totality; on the contrary it sets up 
highly dialectical relationships between musical materials, on many levels and sub-
levels, in a manner that is by no means brought to a tidy conclusion by the end of a 
piece. This is a fundamental part of Beethoven’s visionary modernity which if not 
dampened down in performance, can present a very different view of the composer 
and his work than that the culture industry prefers, by which he moves and stirs the 
listener, but rarely leaves them in type of uncomfortable or questioning state. When 
the inner hierarchies in Beethoven and others’ music are played down in performance, 
so is the composer’s critical and dialectical engagement with these very hierarchies, 
with result that the whole work becomes more mellifluous in nature. By re-etching the 
hierarchies, Harnoncourt could be seen to be viewing the work more readily in terms 
of its critical relationship to its time and place, which in a Benjamin-like manner I 
would suggest increases its ability to project into the present. 
 
But this depends of course on the ways in which the hierarchies are enacted and the 
individual piece’s relationship to them. The ideas of the German theorist and 
nationalist Heinrich Schenker most definitely privileged hierarchical musical 
organisation, but with the crucial caveat that all the inner dialectics of a work were 
goal-oriented towards a final resolution. As such, a piece is dialectical from moment 
to moment, but in totality is a closed and self-contained object, whose interaction with 
anything outside of itself is profoundly undialectical. In this sense, Schenker (who 
supplied some notes on performance aesthetics in the light of this) advocates a view 
of (primarily German) music which is perfectly amenable to the needs of the 
entertainment industry, however inwardly complex the works themselves may be. 
In general, it should be clear that I don’t believe issues of authenticity or 
verisimilitude to be those of primary importance; rather we would do better to 
examine the very social purpose towards which these ideologies are enlisted. The 
ways in which this social relation is made manifest can as much a result of the 
motivation behind the methodologies as the methodologies themselves. 
 
Contemporary views of musical history commonly privilege the ideal of the ‘great 
man’, who ‘transcends their time and place’. Understandably, feminist critics have 
been amongst the first to criticise this ideological viewpoint of artistic creation. 
Sometimes this has been from a point of view that is sceptical towards such 
individualism and as a result placing greater value upon more collective forms of 
music-making (this viewpoint is at the heart of the, to my mind highly misguided and 
naïve, arguments of the American feminist critic Susan McClary). Types of 
performance (not to mention contexts of programming) which present a work as a 
particular instance of a more generalised practice could be said to downplay such 
individualist ideologies (the cults of ‘alienated masculinity’ in the eyes of McClary 
and her followers). The individual work is then viewed more as a historical artefact 
rather than a ‘great work of art’; it has been suggested that some of the qualities 
commonly associated with such works that connotate ‘greatness’ are as much the 
result of particular schools of performance practice, which provide such an aura, as 
anything more specific to the work itself. I will return to this point. 
 
But a diametrically opposed ideological viewpoint is also possible, if one feels an 
affinity with the ideas of Adorno, who McClary cites but seems little to appreciate. 
The very interaction of the subjective will within the field of historical cultural 
practice is precisely what enables the dialectical nature for a work, and (with a nod in 
the direction of Walter Benjamin’s view on German tragic drama) makes it possible 
for such a work to project into the present. In Adorno’s view, an art work which 
simply inhabited the conventions of its time undialectically, was ‘passive’ and had no 
critical function whatsoever; worse it espoused a deindividualising aesthetic which 
Adorno came to associate with the authoritarian personality and fascistic tendencies.  
 
A superficial type of artistic individualism, which Adorno located in jazz (though I 
believe his comments on the subject were too sweeping), involved a change in surface 
details while the deeper conventions and structure remained an absolute constant. This 
can of course be observed in many of the products of the culture industry today, 
notably in some popular music through a move away from the cult of the individual 
‘star’ in favour of more generalised ‘styles’ (house, rave, jungle, garage, techno, etc.). 
Individual variations within these stylistic categories are of extremely secondary 
importance compared to the overarching and clearly identifiable nature of the styles 
themselves. It is almost as if the pretences of individual emancipation have been 
discarded in favour of the naked promotion of a wholly manufactured product. 
 
McClary examines gospel music, and in particular looks at the nature of individual 
solos within the genre. She concludes that for all the ornamental variety that the 
soloist exhibits at such moments, ultimately their solo serves to reinforce the 
underlying harmonic patterns that exist also in the choruses. So the soloist never 
ultimately strays from the group identity, they simply offer some decorative variation 
upon it. This to McClary is collectivist and good. Adorno observes a similar process 
in jazz, but the value judgement he applies is as different as could be imagined. The 
absolute necessity that a soloist never strays too far from the underlying patterns is to 
him indicative of the undialectical nature of the relationship between soloist and 
ensemble, and as such passive and dehumanising. Adorno’s particular modus 
operandi of analysing music in this way still shows, in my opinion, the limitations of 
his high-bourgeois training, taking insufficient account of such matters as timbre or 
vocal/instrumental inflection that for example demonstrate a most pronouncedly 
individualistic quality in the trumpet playing of Louis Armstrong, say. Nonetheless, 
one only has to look at how readily the culture industry appropriates such forms of so-
called collectivist music-making to feel some scepticism towards McClary’s espousal 
of their supposedly subversive potential. Of course the very harmonic patterns 
themselves contained in gospel and other music can and indeed did enter into a 
critical engagement with the conventions they inherited, but this does not seem to be 
the reason for McClary’s celebration of them. One could potentially make similar 
claims for numbers sung by members of the Hitler Youth or the Klu Klux Klan, say, 
as McClary does about gospel. In this sense McClary’s positive view of collectivism 
speaks more about cults of conformity in American society, beneath the veneer of 
pseudo-individualism that such a society likes to propagate, then of any genuinely 
subversive potential. Like many a middle-class American feminist, she presents her 
own American petty-bourgeois values as being those of ‘everywoman’. She succeeds 
in saying much more about the sanctioned ideologies in her elite circle than any 
deeper feminist concerns. 
What I am arguing is very general, and I would like to play you two performances of 
a work to give a concrete representation of the processes I believe to be at work. This 
is the Schubert Gb major Impromptu, the third piece from the D899 set. I will play 
you a bit from two performances, firstly that by Edwin Fischer, made in 1938, the 
second by Lambert Orkis, made in 1989. Fischer plays a concert grand (I do not know 
the exact make) of a type which is in most essential characteristics relatively similar 
to those common to the concert platforms today; Orkis plays a 1826 Conrad Graf 
piano, of a type that would have been highly familiar to Schubert in the Vienna of his 
day. 
[Play excerpts] 
I think you’ll agree with me that these two performances present a very different view 
of the music. A great many mainstream schools of piano playing since the early 20th 
century advocate a style of performance in which one singular voice should generally 
be foregrounded against others which take a much less prominent view. This is at the 
heart of the ideal of the ‘singing line’; it would be equivalent to demanding the 
singular prominence of a soloist (who of course can vary) in an orchestra or choir. If 
this were to be found in a choir, I think one would have little difficult in discerning an 
implicit social differentiation between the solo singer or singers and the rest of the 
members. I don’t see why this should be any different in the context of a polyphonic 
piano piece, and thus why it should be any the less connotative of a world which 
values a few ‘special’ individuals as being of much greater importance than the rest of 
the great multitude of humanity; this is typical of petit-bourgeois ideology.   
Fischer’s performance epitomises what has come to be seen as a type of 'old-world 
charm', with an unbroken melodic line, maximum continuity, melody always in the 
foreground, and a type of pathos that could be seen today as sentimental.  In Orkis, on 
the other hand, there is a more intricate relationship between the different parts, the 
accompaniment figures don't merely underline the melody but interact in a manner 
that is more dialectical (the attitude to voicing and the lesser sustaining power of the 
instrument he plays on are crucial here), and much more striking contrasts of texture 
and timbre (not least through the much greater tonal shift provided by the una corda 
on the instrument he plays). Fischer’s is a performance to sink back, languish and lose 
oneself in reverie about, whereas Orkis forces a different engagement on the part of 
the listener with a more complex and occasionally dark reality; this performance has a 
unity, certainly, but many tensions entailed are by no means resolved comfortably by 
the time of the final tonic chord.  To me, the latter speaks much more about the 
Vienna that Schubert inhabited, riven by immense poverty, political instability, anti-
Semitism, total ostracization of homosexuals, etc.; his consciousness can hardly have 
been untouched by such factors.  In Fischer’s performance, on the other hand, I hear 
an uncritical affirmation of a society that did relatively little for Schubert in his 
lifetime, but now wants to celebrate his music as the epitome of that culture.  In short, 
Orkis’s performance seems much more 'real', and in the sense of representing to my 
ears a more 'authentic' (!) representation of the individual living in society, is much 
more genuinely personal than an attitude of nostalgic individualism could attain.  
It's highly unlikely that these sorts of ideologies are the result of conscious decisions 
towards such ends on the parts of the performers, but conscious intention is a very 
limited concept. The individual performers are in part products of a multitude of 
determinants, including the dominant ideologies of their own time, which affect their 
own consciousness. This is not of course to deny the possibility and value of some 
subjective interaction with such determinants, which I believe even Fischer enacts to 
some extent within his rather kitschy view of Schubert. 
In order to accept the importance of 'cult' composers (or of 'cult' performers), requires 
a belief that these individuals are somehow 'special' (i.e. somehow 'better people', or 
more 'interesting'); therefore their own totally inner worlds are a window onto some 
higher state of consciousness. This is where the notion of art as simple self-expression 
utterly falls down, in my opinion; it stands as a typical late-romantic affectation that 
hardly existed in any such form before, and which modernism rightly reacted against. 
The most intensely personal of music of the last few centuries still embodies an 
engagement on the part of the composer, whose relationship with the society and 
culture they inhabit may be askew or alienated, but no less of a relationship itself. 
These individuals exist 'in the world' rather than retreating into a solipsistic personal 
mythology of their own.  The early romantics saw self-expression and irrationality as 
a reaction to the formal structures, cultural and social, that had preceded them; this 
quintessentially dialectical and engaged relationship was emblematic of radical 
bourgeois consciousness which found its manifestation in the culture of the time. By 
the time of the consolidation of the position of the bourgeoisie, perhaps to be located 
most prominently after the failed revolutions of 1848, such self-expression had a very 
different meaning indeed.  
But I find that this sort of engagement in the early romantics can still be meaningful 
and powerful nowadays, when it isn't all filtered through a late-romantic performing 
tradition, reducing the music to the type of naive individualism that the culture 
industry finds serves its own purpose best (and best fulfills the unspoken perception 
of art as little more than an entertainment given a certain veneer of high-class 
respectability).    
The uses of music for political propaganda are well known – I believe that 
Beethoven’s music was used to this end by Churchill, Hitler and Stalin. One might 
therefore conclude that the music is ideologically neutral, as it seems to be able to be 
equally easily appropriated for such different political ideologies. But I don’t believe 
this to be case, it is rather a particular type of performance of Beethoven that can be 
used to these ends, above all when that presents the music as self-contained and 
‘closed’ in the manners I was describing before. And of course other means are 
regularly used for such purposes, including the extraction of choice snippets as 
compared to the more intricate arguments that are presented over a work’s span. But 
even when appropriating short, complete, works, performance can play a fundamental 
part in rendering music amenable in these terms. One socialist comrade bleakly 
suggested to me that anything can be appropriated one way or another, so there is 
little point in any artist attempting to resist it. I don’t share this pessimistic outlook, 
which requires a faith in the relative immutability of meaning in an original ‘text’. 
One example in this respect that I have heard cited is the use of the ‘Red Flag’, which 
became a mocking signature tune for the 1980s comedy series ‘Citizen Smith’, about 
a self-styled popular revolutionary living in a suburban environment, whose deluded 
sense of the importance of his own activities is at the heart of the comedy. For this 
signature tune, the ‘Red Flag’ was whistled at a tempo considerably speeded up from 
that at which anyone could feasibly sing it, so as to sound jaunty and rather quaintly 
ridiculous, with none of the inspirational qualities that is often found when it is sung 
at party meetings and the like. Without wanting to pronounce judgements on how and 
that what extent revolutionary fervour might be contained within the original song, I 
simply wish to point out how this form of appropriation necessitated a fundamental 
change of performance practice. Such performance practice can indeed have an effect 
on the original ‘work’ in such a manner as to vitally change its scope of possible 
meanings. One need only look at Hendrix’s rendition of ‘The Star-Spangled Banner’ 
at Woodstock in 1969, violent, demented, sexual, full of screeching sounds very 
reminiscent of those associated with bombings and sirens in the war in Vietnam that 
was being watched on American television screens at the time. Could anyone really 
hear this style of performance as a statement of patriotism in the manner that the 
Sousa original had come to represent? 
I would like to suggest one further opinion (one for which I can claim no more 
rigorous justification other than hunch and subconscious conviction, though further 
research on this subject should be forthcoming at a later date!). From the 1920s 
onwards, popular musics gained a much greater level of international prominence than 
hitherto, as a result of the growth in the recording and sheet music industries. The 
growth in profile of these musics, on one hand market-driven but also representative 
of a wider range of class and ethnicity in terms of the musicians, presented a serious 
challenge to the hegemony of the ‘classical’ world, an issue that remains with us 
today. As a result, it is possible that ‘classical’ musicians, perhaps subconsciously, 
strove to make more obviously palpable the distinctions between their own styles of 
performance and those of popular musicians who may have been considered socially 
or racially inferior. A diminution in such attributes as sharp accentuation, driving 
rhythms, vibrato-less playing of string instruments, thinner, drier textures and more 
individuated voicing, the art of improvisation and embellishment upon basic texts, all 
serve to make the sound of ‘classical’ music most distinct from various types of 
popular idioms. I believe many of these stylistic elements were indeed present in 
‘classical’ performance practice of the nineteenth- century (for example, if we were 
able to hear Paganini play today, in some ways his style might be closer to, say, an 
Eastern European folk violinist than to many of the hallowed virtuosos that dominate 
our concert stages today). All these particular diminutions serve the purpose of 
mystification, removing music from a realm of lived experience into a more 
phantasmagoric realm (or ‘disinterested appreciation’ as John Berger described 
mystification in art criticism). Such mystical ideals run as deep in classical musical 
culture as they did in the aesthetic ideologies of any number of imperial monarchies, 
relying on simultaneous qualities of sumptuousness and aura to create the impression 
of allure combined with unattainability for those outside that hyper-privileged class. If 
my convictions are correct, it may be the case that a increased stratification between 
‘high’ and ‘low’ performing styles are an unfortunate by-product of a broadening of 
the culture industry’s scope. This raises profound questions about the whole 
construction of the idea of ‘classical’ music per se, at least as it is understood today. 
I would conclude that performers music play a crucial part in rendering the music they 
play amenable to various ideological purposes and thus propagating a particular social 
function for if. All performers should be aware of this and address these issues 
critically whenever preparing a work. 
 
 
 
 
